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Introduction
Over the last two decades, some 
Australian States and Territories 
have introduced Indigenous Justice 
Agreements (IJAs) and related 
strategic frameworks in the hope of 
addressing consistently high rates 
of Indigenous incarceration and 
improving justice service delivery 
to Indigenous people. Drawing on 
earlier research by the authors,3 
this Research Brief provides an 
overview and analysis of the IJAs, 
and examines whether strategic 
planning on Indigenous justice issues 
is improving Indigenous justice 
outcomes as intended. We identify 
four key factors for success of IJAs, 
along with key challenges likely to 
impact upon their effectiveness. 
Despite significant shortcomings, we 
conclude that IJAs do have a positive 
impact, in particular by providing 
Indigenous people with input into 
strategic planning, and providing 
government with a systematic 
and coherent strategy to address 
Indigenous justice issues, including 
over-representation and victimisation. 
IJAs: Background and 
Development
Since the Royal Commission into 
Aboriginal Deaths in Custody 
(RCADIC) reported in 1991, 
various whole of government and 
departmental strategies and policies 
have been introduced for the purpose 
of improving criminal justice agency 
service delivery to Indigenous 
people and to reduce Indigenous 
over-representation in the criminal 
justice system. The most important 
of these at the State and Territory 
level has been the development of 
IJAs negotiated between government 
and peak Indigenous bodies. We 
also note more recent changes at 
the federal level with the introduction 
of the National Indigenous Law and 
Justice Framework 2009-20154 and 
the current development of justice 
strategies by the National Congress of 
Australia’s First Peoples (Congress).5 
The recommendations of the RCADIC 
have been an important driver in 
the development of Indigenous 
strategic policy over the last two 
decades.6 Governments in each 
jurisdiction committed themselves 
to implementing the majority 
of the 339 Royal Commission 
recommendations. Consistent with 
the need to report on implementation 
of the recommendations, some 
justice agencies also developed 
strategic plans with an aim to improve 
service delivery and to reduce 
Indigenous over-representation in 
the criminal justice system. However, 
as we discuss further below, the 
development of Indigenous strategic 
plans by justice-related government 
departments and agencies has been 
highly inconsistent. 
The RCADIC had also recommended 
that independent Aboriginal Justice 
Advisory Councils (AJACs) be 
established at the State and Territory 
level to provide advice to government 
on justice-related matters, as well as 
to monitor the implementation of the 
Royal Commission recommendations. 
In the period immediately following 
the RCIADIC, all Australian States 
and Territories established AJACs. 
However, in subsequent years, many 
of the AJACs were either abolished or 
allowed to collapse by government. 
The Victorian AJAC (established in 
1993 and now decentralised into 
regional and local AJACs) is the only 
Advisory Committee structure still in 
existence from the period immediately 
following the RCADIC. 
As a response to concerns about 
the outcomes of the RCADIC and 
the continuing issues of deaths 
in custody and high incarceration 
rates, a Summit meeting was held in 
Canberra in 1997 involving AJACs, 
the then Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Commission (ATSIC), 
the Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Social Justice Commission 
and Commonwealth, State and 
Territory ministers responsible for 
various criminal justice portfolios. 
The Summit recommended that 
Commonwealth, State and Territory 
governments develop bilateral 
agreements on justice issues 
(IJAs) as a way of improving the 
delivery of justice programs, and 
that governments negotiate with 
AJACs and other relevant Indigenous 
organisations in the development 
of the agreements. All States and 
Territories (except for the Northern 
Territory) agreed to develop, in 
partnership with Indigenous people, 
strategic agreements relating to the 
delivery, funding, and coordination of 
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Indigenous programs and services. 
These agreements would address 
social, economic, and cultural issues; 
justice issues; customary law; law 
reform; and government funding levels 
for programs. The agreements would 
include targets for reducing the rate 
of Indigenous over-representation in 
the criminal justice system, planning 
mechanisms, methods of service 
delivery, monitoring and evaluation.7
IJAs were subsequently developed in 
five jurisdictions over a ten-year period: 
• Queensland (the Queensland 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Justice Agreement 
(2000)) (Qld IJA);8
• Victoria (the Victorian Aboriginal 
Justice Agreement (2000)) 
(VAJA);9 
• New South Wales (the New 
South Wales Aboriginal Justice 
Agreement (2003) (NSW AJA) 
and Aboriginal Justice Plan (2004) 
(NSW AJP));10
• Western Australia (the Western 
Australian Aboriginal Justice 
Agreement 2004-2009 (2004)) 
(WA AJA);11 and
• the ACT (the ACT Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Agreement 
(2010)) (ACT IJA).12
IJAs in both Western Australia and 
Queensland have now expired and 
have not been renewed.13 Victoria 
has retained the VAJA and is due to 
release VAJA3 in early 2013,14 and the 
NSW AJP and ACT IJA remain current.
While these Agreements vary in 
some important respects, they 
have attempted at a minimum to 
address the issue of Indigenous 
over-representation through one 
or more overarching goals, a set 
of key principles, the identification 
of specific strategic areas (such 
as juvenile justice diversionary 
alternatives, the development of 
non-custodial sentencing options, 
and so on), plus initiatives to 
achieve outcomes within each 
strategic sphere. The differences, 
whilst without doubt impacting upon 
the effectiveness of respective 
Agreements, reflected various factors 
including the diversity between 
Indigenous communities residing 
in each jurisdiction,15 differences in 
legislative and/or policy histories 
between the various jurisdictions,16 
and specific policy imperatives.17 
These IJAs were the product of a 
negotiation process involving relevant 
government departments and 
Indigenous representative/advisory 
bodies, including ATSIC and AJACs. 
Indigenous organisations played 
an important role in negotiating the 
Agreements, and in this respect 
at least, the IJAs reflected the 
importance of principles of negotiation 
and self-determination emphasised 
by the RCADIC.18  
In many States and Territories, 
criminal justice agencies such as 
police services, corrections, juvenile 
justice, and Attorneys-General 
have also developed their own 
strategic plans for working with or 
responding to Indigenous clients. 
Some have been aimed at reducing 
over-representation, while others 
have focussed on more effective 
service delivery. These should be 
distinguished from IJAs because 
they are not negotiated agreements 
between Indigenous peak bodies and 
government, although their aims may 
be similar. 
A third tier of recent policy 
development has been the 
introduction of overarching 
government policy frameworks at 
the State and Territory level which 
focus upon Indigenous people. 
These are more general in scope 
but usually place some emphasis 
upon Indigenous justice issues. 
An example of these overarching 
government policy frameworks is the 
now-expired New South Wales Two 
Ways Together 2003-2012 (TWT) 
Aboriginal Affairs Plan19 and the 
current Queensland Just Futures 
Strategy 2012-2015. 20  
The evaluation of 
Indigenous Justice 
Agreements
Although there are differences 
between the five IJAs in New South 
Wales, Victoria, Western Australia, 
ACT and Queensland, all introduced 
a broad sweep of key strategies, 
outcomes, and actions generally 
directed towards reducing the number 
of Indigenous people in custody. 
Despite their significance, there has 
been surprisingly little evaluation 
undertaken to date at a national 
or jurisdictional level with respect 
to either the implementation of IJA 
strategies or to the overall success of 
government strategic planning in this 
area. There is thus no clear picture 
as to how or whether these policy 
frameworks are working effectively to 
either improve service delivery or to 
reduce Indigenous contact with the 
justice system. 
Given that some time has now passed 
since both the release of the RCADIC 
report and the formal commitment 
provided by governments to develop 
relevant strategic plans, assessment 
of the effectiveness of IJAs and related 
strategic policy is well overdue. The 
demise of ATSIC and most AJACs, 
and the relative newness of Congress 
(incorporated April 2010) make 
independent assessment particularly 
urgent. The loss of Indigenous 
representative bodies has diminished 
the opportunity for genuine Indigenous 
participation in policy development, 
implementation and independent 
oversight. In this context there has 
been increasing reliance on 
departmental or agency self-reporting 
on progress and effectiveness, which 
are not always publicly available, 
rather than independent evaluation or 
monitoring.
The absence of independent 
evaluation of policy frameworks 
necessarily impacts upon the ability to 
provide either cross-jurisdictional or 
national analysis of the effectiveness 
of planning in this area. To date, 
there have only been independent 
external evaluations commissioned 
by government in relation to two IJAs 
(Queensland21 and Victoria22) and to 
two agency-specific strategic plans in 
New South Wales (Juvenile Justice23 
and Police24). Beyond this there has 
been little independent assessment 
or evaluation of IJA outcomes. We 
note the planned external evaluation 
of the National Indigenous Justice 
Framework is due to be conducted 
over 2013-2014. 
Key factors for success 
of Indigenous Justice 
Agreements
In the first instance, a distinction 
needs to be made between the 
assessment or evaluation of an 
Agreement which is a strategic 
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framework for particular policies 
and initiatives and the evaluation of 
specific programs. Justice programs 
are far more likely to be evaluated 
than a broader strategic framework, 
which is likely to comprise multiple 
strategic areas and numerous 
programs. We are interested in this 
Research Brief in how we assess 
and evaluate a strategic framework 
(the IJAs), rather than any specific 
programs or initiatives (such as, for 
example, Indigenous sentencing 
courts, or post-release services).
Inevitably, there will be a range 
of contingencies impacting upon 
the ability of IJAs to achieve their 
intended outcomes, leading to 
increased complexity in assessing 
outcomes.  We have already noted 
above, for instance, the relevance 
that both government dismantling 
of Indigenous representative bodies 
and divergent policy imperatives 
and legislative histories within the 
different jurisdictions appear to have 
in terms of the development of IJAs. 
We also discuss below how diversity 
between jurisdictions in terms of the 
geographical location and range of 
Indigenous communities will influence 
government capacity to engage with 
Indigenous people. General changes 
in law, policy and practice can also 
negatively or positively impact upon 
justice outcomes for Indigenous 
people, regardless of any reform 
achieved through an IJA. 
We suggest four criteria for assessing 
the effectiveness of IJAs as a 
strategic framework for responding 
to Indigenous over-representation 
in the criminal justice system, and 
improving justice service delivery:
a. effective levels of Indigenous 
community engagement in the 
development, implementation and 
evaluation of IJAs;
b. effective accountability and 
evaluation processes, including 
clarity of stated IJA objectives and 
outcomes;
c. continuity and whole of government 
approaches to Indigenous policy 
development; and
d. effective incorporation into IJAs of 
the issue of Indigenous criminal 
victimisation, and recognition of 
the links with other civil and family 
law needs.
Effective levels of Indigenous 
community engagement in the  
development, implementation and 
evaluation of IJAs.
A significant finding of our research 
is that there is a direct relationship 
between the formulation of an IJA 
and the existence of an independent, 
community-based Indigenous 
representative advisory body. 
The absence of an independent 
Indigenous body negatively impacts 
on strategic policy development 
and, ultimately, upon the ability of 
government and communities to work 
together to address issues relating to 
Indigenous over-representation.25
 In four of the five States with IJAs, an 
Indigenous peak advisory body was 
instrumental in its conception - the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Board (ATSIAB) in Queensland, 
the AJAC in New South Wales, the 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Elected Body and Aboriginal Justice 
Centre in the ACT, and the AJAC in 
Victoria. In Western Australia, the 
Aboriginal Justice Council assisted 
with the development of the Aboriginal 
Justice Plan (WA) (2000),26 which 
was a precursor to the WA AJA. The 
Western Australian Aboriginal Justice 
Council was subsequently disbanded 
and therefore not involved in the 
formulation of the later AJA.27
The importance of properly constituted, 
ongoing Indigenous representative 
bodies to the development of justice 
policy was noted by the RCADIC, 
reiterated by the 1997 Summit and 
recognised in a number of inquiries 
and evaluations in the area of 
Indigenous justice. The influential 
Western Australian Mahoney Inquiry 
(conducted in relation to community 
and custodial corrections), for instance, 
indicated that a representative State 
Indigenous Advisory Group (and 
regional counterpart organisations) 
should be established in that 
jurisdiction if Indigenous incarceration 
is to be reduced.28 Further, the Western 
Australian Law Reform Commission in 
its report on Aboriginal customary law 
published in 2006 also recommended 
establishing a state-wide AJAC to 
assist in negotiation around Community 
Justice Groups (CJGs).29 
Our research indicates that where 
Indigenous representative/advisory 
bodies do not exist there is less 
chance that an IJA will be developed 
and also less chance that government 
justice agencies will develop their 
own strategic policies and initiatives. 
It appears that without independent 
Indigenous representative bodies, 
it is less likely that there will be 
sufficient political will to develop and 
drive an IJA. 
IJAs often highlight Indigenous 
capacity building, participation and 
self-determination as fundamental 
principles that are critical to 
attaining IJA objectives. In this 
context, self-determination requires 
that Indigenous communities are 
endowed with both the capability 
and authority to develop their own 
justice solutions to relevant issues, 
or to participate in key decision-
making processes.30 Certainly, 
the most effective IJAs provide for 
inclusive, ongoing engagement with 
Indigenous communities throughout 
the entire ‘life’ of any relevant 
framework; that is, during the initial 
design, implementation, monitoring, 
and evaluation. 
In order to achieve quality community 
engagement, an IJA must have 
relevance at regional and local 
levels through the development of 
local justice plans or through the 
development of localised, community-
based services or groups. Indeed, 
many of the programs identified as 
constituting best practice in this area, 
such as Community Justice Groups, 
incorporate these elements.31  
The independent evaluations of 
the Queensland and Victorian 
IJAs recognised the importance of 
community engagement in achieving 
the desired outcomes and for the 
overall successful implementation of 
these Agreements. 32 A most important 
contribution to capacity building in 
this context is the establishment 
of Indigenous, community-based, 
representative/advisory processes 
to enable quality community 
participation and leadership to 
be realised.  It is positive that in 
some States, community justice 
bodies have been set up at State, 
regional and local levels as part of 
implementation of IJAs and justice 
agency strategic plans – the Victorian 
process discussed further below is 
the best example of this strategy.
The VAJA has been effective in 
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providing for ongoing Aboriginal 
ownership of, and participation in 
strategic policy development. The 
creation under the VAJA framework 
of well-coordinated state, regional 
and local community-based 
justice structures, involved in the 
implementation of regional and local 
justice plans, represents successful 
application of engagement 
principles.33 The VAJA emphasised 
the importance of establishing, as an 
essential first step, infrastructure that 
would guarantee ongoing Indigenous 
input into the Agreement - setting 
up the state-wide Aboriginal Justice 
Forum (AJF) and the Regional and 
Local Aboriginal Justice Advisory 
Committees (RAJACs and LAJACs) to 
work alongside relevant government 
agencies and the Victorian AJAC in 
progressing the VAJA. 
Effective accountability and 
evaluation processes, including 
clarity of stated IJA objectives and 
outcomes.
One reason for the absence 
of independent evaluation and 
monitoring of IJAs and Indigenous 
justice strategies is the lack of 
provision within strategic policy 
frameworks for ongoing monitoring 
or evaluation. An example of this 
is the Western Australian Strategic 
Policy on Police and Aboriginal 
People, which consists, effectively, of 
an elaborated set of principles, with 
no detail provided about procedures 
for evaluation (or implementation).34 
The absence of clear objectives and 
outcomes makes evaluation difficult. 
Another problem is that monitoring 
and evaluation may be provided for 
within the relevant Agreement or 
framework and then not carried out, 
as has occurred with the New South 
Wales Aboriginal Justice Plan.  In 
addition, the failure to document 
or make publicly available material 
pertaining to monitoring or evaluation, 
as has occurred in relation to the final 
evaluation of the WA AJA post-2008, 
limits government accountability.
The lack of independent monitoring 
or evaluation reduces government 
accountability to Indigenous 
communities. It also means that 
relevant frameworks are not 
informed by or improved through 
completion of such processes. 
In the absence of independent 
monitoring and evaluation, one must 
depend almost solely upon internally 
generated sources of information to 
ascertain the success or failure of 
strategic policy. The experience of 
monitoring the implementation of the 
recommendations from the RCADIC 
shows that departmental annual 
reports or similar review material is not 
the most reliable means of measuring 
performance given the tendency of 
departments and agencies to portray 
their work in the best possible light.35 
A further failing of particular relevance 
to Indigenous-focussed strategic 
policy occurs when monitoring or 
evaluation is completed without 
effective Indigenous participation. 
The VAJA provides a good 
contrasting example of significant 
contribution from Indigenous 
communities (through Indigenous 
parties to the Agreement) in the 
setting of benchmarks, performance 
indicators, targets and timelines, 
and their involvement in specific 
evaluation processes. There is a 
direct role played by the Indigenous 
community-based peak coordinating 
body established under the VAJA, 
the Aboriginal Justice Forum (AJF), in 
Department of Justice performance.36 
On the basis of our research we 
would argue that independent, 
ongoing monitoring and evaluation 
at a jurisdictional level, providing 
for maximum Indigenous input, will 
enhance the effectiveness of IJAs 
and strategic plans. 
Continuity and whole of 
government approaches in policy 
development
Those States and Territories with 
existing IJAs in place also have 
the greatest number of agency-
specific strategic frameworks 
dealing with the issue of Indigenous 
over-representation and seeking 
to improve service delivery for 
Indigenous people. IJAs are likely 
to have also led to increased whole-
of-government planning directed 
towards addressing Indigenous social 
disadvantage – the latter of relevance 
to addressing rates of Indigenous 
incarceration as well as clearly 
requiring attention from government 
as a significant issue in its own right. 
As noted above, to date IJAs have 
been formulated in five jurisdictions. 
Three of the five jurisdictions which 
have developed an IJA since 2000 
have also formulated whole-of-
government ‘overarching’ Indigenous 
strategic policy covering a broader 
social and economic framework, with 
some emphasis upon justice issues. 
Notably, all jurisdictions which have 
not introduced an IJA have also not 
developed overarching Indigenous 
strategic policy. Relevant policy in 
NSW, Qld and Victoria is as follows: 
•	 Two Ways Together 2003-2012 
(NSW);
•	 Partnerships Queensland: 
Future Directions Framework 
for Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Policy 2005-2010 (Qld);37 
•	 Just Futures Strategy 2012-2015 
(Qld); and
•	 Victorian Indigenous Affairs 
Framework – Improving the Lives 
of Indigenous Victorians (2006) 
(Victoria).38
The Victorian Justice Agreement, in 
particular, specifically emphasised 
the need for development by 
government of an overarching 
integrated strategic framework to 
tackle the ‘whole-of-life’ experience 
of Aboriginal people, in keeping with 
the RCADIC’s dual focus upon both 
reform of the criminal justice system 
and underlying factors contributing to 
Indigenous incarceration rates. This 
emphasis gave rise to formulation 
of the Victorian Indigenous Affairs 
Framework (VIAF) in that jurisdiction. 
Further, in states that have 
formulated an IJA, criminal justice 
agencies are more likely to have 
in place an Indigenous-specific 
strategic plan.39 The development by 
agencies of their specific strategic 
framework has particular benefits. 
For example, the New South Wales 
Police Force Aboriginal Strategic 
Direction 2012-2017 provides for 
public acknowledgement of the 
agency’s approach to working with 
Aboriginal people in New South 
Wales and thus greater transparency 
in policy. Criminal justice agencies 
in these jurisdictions are also more 
likely to have some previous history 
of Indigenous strategic planning over 
the last decade or longer.
By way of contrast, Tasmania, the 
Northern Territory, and South Australia 
have not developed IJAs, and they 
are also the jurisdictions where 
specific justice agencies like police or 
corrections have been least likely to 
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develop any form of current strategic 
framework relating to Indigenous 
justice issues. Only one of those four 
jurisdictions, the Northern Territory, 
has developed a relevant but now 
expired government overarching 
strategic policy framework – Agenda 
for Action: a whole of government 
approach to Indigenous affairs in the 
Northern Territory 2005-2009.40
Our research shows that with respect 
to criminal justice agencies, police 
services were the most likely of all 
justice agencies to have implemented 
Indigenous-specific strategic 
plans. Attorneys-General, courts 
administrations, Offices of the Director 
of Public Prosecutions (DPPs), and 
Legal Aid Commissions (LACs) are the 
least likely to have developed these 
frameworks. The latter two agencies 
are also, notably, the least likely to be 
identified within IJAs as key agencies 
with specific responsibilities affecting 
Indigenous outcomes.  
It should be noted that most justice 
agencies are developing and 
delivering a number of programs 
directed towards improving 
Indigenous outcomes in the criminal 
justice system. Whilst sometimes 
these initiatives have been 
informed by or have evolved from 
a Justice Agreement or state policy 
framework, at other times they have 
been developed independently of 
any strategic framework. In these 
situations Indigenous programs can 
appear ad hoc and unrelated to any 
broader policy developments. It may 
be completely unclear what strategic 
framework or decision-making, if any, 
has given rise to a particular initiative. 
Without detracting from the success 
and significance of initiatives and 
programs created and operating 
outside formal policy frameworks 
by justice agencies, our research 
indicated that all justice agencies 
ought to be encouraged to develop 
their own Indigenous strategic 
plans so as to better focus the work 
that is already being undertaken in 
this area. There are obvious and 
significant advantages to embedding 
relevant initiatives within transparent 
policy frameworks. This process, for 
instance, establishes clear processes 
of evaluation and implementation 
to ensure accountability and to 
also, ultimately, enhance overall 
performance. In addition, agency 
strategic plans should indicate 
whether or how they are informed by, 
or aligned with, an existing IJA.  
The importance of continuity in 
policy development
The lack of continuity in Indigenous 
strategic policy development also 
affects the ability of justice agencies 
to engage with Indigenous people, 
to achieve desired outcomes, and to 
ensure better service delivery. There 
may be policy ‘black holes’ where for 
some considerable period of time 
agencies allow strategic policies to 
lapse, with no account as to why this 
has occurred in a particular instance. 
For example, the New South Wales 
Department of Corrective Services 
Action Plan for the Management of 
Indigenous Offenders 1996-1998 
was followed after a five year gap by 
the Aboriginal Offenders Strategic 
Plan 2003-2005 and then after 
another two years by a Aboriginal 
Strategic Plan 2007-2012.41  There 
are many occasions where a 
policy implementation or reporting 
framework disappears (as occurred 
with ‘action plans’ under the Qld IJA 
after 2001), with no indication that it 
has been phased out due to failure. 
The issue of continuity in strategic 
planning is important. After reviewing 
Indigenous justice strategies across 
Australia, it is clear that constant 
change in government policy is a 
significant barrier to success. Regular 
change disrupts processes of reform 
and accountability. For example, 
there may be two or three significant 
changes in policy frameworks in five 
or six years, although there is no 
indication (through evaluation) that 
previous strategies failed. It becomes 
difficult to determine the extent to 
which central strategic planning 
through an IJA or a state-wide plan 
has impacted on departmental or 
agency policy, or whether existing 
policies and programs are simply 
rearranged, recycled, and rebadged 
to fit a new strategic direction.
The fundamental link between 
reducing Indigenous over-
representation in the criminal 
justice system and addressing 
underlying contributory factors (such 
as low employment rates, alcohol 
and drug misuse, poor health, 
and poor educational attainment 
within Indigenous communities) is 
acknowledged in all IJAs. IJAs have 
largely delegated any action to be 
taken in relation to the underlying 
causes of over-representation in the 
criminal justice system to government 
overarching strategic frameworks. 
Whilst the essential link between 
justice and broader socio-economic 
factors must be understood, there 
needs to be firm lines drawn between 
planning areas if Indigenous justice is 
to maintain its status as an important 
issue in its own right. For example, the 
VAJA1, whilst referring to findings of 
the RCADIC linking Indigenous over-
representation and the ‘whole-of-
life’ experience of Aboriginal people, 
delegated to the Victorian government 
responsibility for developing a whole-
of-government Indigenous strategic 
framework dealing with Indigenous 
structural disadvantage.42 In this 
way, the Victorian IJA could focus 
on Indigenous justice issues almost 
exclusively and this approach 
has contributed to the overall 
effectiveness of the VAJA. Thus it is 
those IJAs that manage to maintain 
a specific focus upon justice issues 
that appear more likely to deliver 
genuinely positive justice outcomes 
to Indigenous people.
Effective incorporation into 
IJAs of the important issue of 
Indigenous victimisation and 
recognition of the links with other 
civil and family law needs
Indigenous people are over-
represented in the criminal justice 
system as both offenders and victims, 
and any strategic policy framework 
seeking to reduce offending rates of 
Indigenous people must focus to an 
appropriate extent upon the high rates 
of Indigenous victimisation – the latter 
underpinned by similar factors that lead 
to Indigenous offending. Generally 
speaking, IJAs have not done enough 
to address the issue of Indigenous 
victimisation (including issues of 
family violence and child protection), 
despite its close connection with 
Indigenous incarceration. Justice 
agencies such as police already 
have responsibility and capacity to 
respond to Indigenous family violence 
and sexual assault, in contrast to 
broader social disadvantage. Their 
capacity and responsibilities in this 
context needs to be clarified and 
developed within IJAs, including in the 
development of specific policies and 
practices for working with Indigenous 
victims of crime.
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The approach taken to date in relation 
to this issue in IJAs is, in some 
respects, piecemeal and inconsistent 
between jurisdictions. There is some 
recognition of the connection between 
family violence and offending in some 
IJAs. For instance, the NSW AJP 
committed to developing statewide 
strategies to reduce family violence in 
Aboriginal communities, and it includes 
in its Strategic Directions actions 
such as providing sexual assault 
counselling to Aboriginal prisoners.43 
The WA AJA also incorporated as 
one of its three principal outcomes 
a reduction in the rate of Indigenous 
victimisation and made further 
reference to this issue by, for example, 
calling for better protection for victims 
and their families.44  
In our view, negotiated IJAs can 
take the lead on the subject of 
Indigenous victimisation. The issue is 
fundamental to any attempt to reduce 
Indigenous over-representation 
and improving justice outcomes, so 
cannot be conceived of separately 
from over-representation. Secondly, 
a negotiated response through a 
Justice Agreement is more likely 
to lead to policies that respect 
Indigenous views. 
A further point to emphasise is that 
in order to be effective, IJAs should 
identify the link between enhanced 
Indigenous access to family and civil 
law justice and improved criminal 
justice outcomes for Indigenous 
people.45 The interconnectedness of 
criminal with civil and family law justice 
has been drawn out in existing policy 
to some extent, but there is scope for 
greater acknowledgement if IJAs are 
to be as effective as possible. By way 
of illustration, the VAJA2 included as 
one of its two main aims the need to 
ensure that the Koori community has 
‘the same access to human, civil and 
legal rights, living free from racism 
and discrimination and experiencing 
the same justice outcomes (as the 
broader community) through the 
elimination of inequities in the justice 
system’. Congress has noted the high 
levels of unmet need in civil and family 
law areas, and in its justice policy 
targets include the goal of doubling 
the number of Indigenous people 
accessing legal assistance in family 
and civil law matters. Congress views 
access to civil and family law as part 
of a holistic approach to ‘justice’. 
The importance of 
effective Indigenous 
Justice Agreements
Having discussed the development 
of Indigenous-specific criminal 
justice strategic planning, particularly 
IJAs, it is important to take a step 
back and consider whether these 
policy frameworks are working 
effectively and to the benefit of 
Indigenous people throughout 
Australia. If we consider current 
imprisonment rates for Indigenous 
people nationally and the levels of 
over-representation, perhaps there 
is little cause for optimism. Western 
Australia (which had an IJA) has the 
highest Indigenous imprisonment 
rate in Australia. However, states 
with current IJAs (NSW and Victoria) 
are below the national average 
rate of Indigenous imprisonment. 
Queensland, which had an IJA in 
place for a decade, also has below 
average Indigenous imprisonment 
rates.  Indeed Victoria, which has an 
IJA that meets the highest standards 
in terms of Indigenous participation, 
implementation, monitoring, and 
independent evaluation, until recently 
had one of the lowest Indigenous 
imprisonment rates in Australia: at 
almost half the national figure. Recent 
changes to law and order in that State 
have seen significant increases in adult 
imprisonment for both indigenous and 
non-Indigenous people.46
We have argued in this brief that 
a broader examination of the 
effectiveness of relevant strategic 
planning is necessary. We also 
note a key limitation in considering 
effectiveness: the lack of independent 
monitoring and evaluation. Despite 
this, it is possible to conclude that 
IJAs have contributed to a more 
coherent government focus upon 
Indigenous justice issues and, in 
those jurisdictions where they exist, 
they have been associated with 
criminal justice agencies developing 
Indigenous-specific frameworks. As 
we have outlined previously, they have 
also led to development of a number 
of effective initiatives and programs 
in the justice area. An IJA can also 
advance principles of government 
accountability with independent 
monitoring and evaluation, with 
maximum Indigenous input into those 
processes. IJAs have effectively 
progressed Indigenous community 
engagement, self-management, 
and ownership where they have set 
up effective and well-coordinated 
community-based justice structures 
and/or led to the development of 
localised strategic planning, as well 
as through encouraging initiatives 
that embody such ideals. For reasons 
noted above, the VAJA is the best 
example of these outcomes.
There are a number of lessons which 
can be learnt from the experiences 
of developing IJAs over recent 
years. Firstly, it is only in those 
jurisdictions with an IJA which 
contains monitoring and evaluative 
components (in particular, Victoria 
and Queensland) that we have any 
overall picture of the various justice 
programs and initiatives that are in 
operation. We argue that IJAs need 
to be developed in those jurisdictions 
where they remain outstanding, as do 
justice agency strategic plans. These 
developments are imperative, given 
the national approach through the 
National Indigenous Law and Justice 
Framework 2009-2015. 
Secondly, there needs to be 
greater continuity in strategic policy 
development within jurisdictions, 
and within and between agencies. 
Our research showed that policy 
frameworks are formulated and 
then disappear with little attention to 
whether they were effective in meeting 
outcomes. Thirdly, and as part of the 
commitment by government to deal 
with Indigenous over-representation, 
IJAs also must address Indigenous 
victimisation and broader access to 
civil and family law. Fourthly, the fact 
that the development of IJAs has 
been set back by the dismantling 
of independent Indigenous 
representative/advisory bodies, 
particularly at the State and Territory 
level, should also cause some 
concern. Independent representation 
for Indigenous communities is a 
crucial component of any further 
development of strategic policy. 
Finally it must be recognised that 
broader changes in criminal justice 
law, policy and practice impact 
significantly on Indigenous people. In 
this context, we would argue for the 
introduction of legislation mandating 
that Aboriginal impact statements 
must be considered as part of any 
development of or amendments to 
relevant criminal-justice focussed law 
in each jurisdiction.47
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